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I. INTRODUCTION
Wildfire presents an unprecedented and growing threat to
America's forests. A variety of factors have combined to create some
of the worst and largest wildfires in modem history.' The negative
effects from wildfires stretch beyond environmental concerns;
wildfire suppression costs are also an enormous drain on
increasingly-tight public funds. In 2008, state and federal
governments spent over $1.7 billion on fighting wildfire in California
alone, 2 the same amount needed in education funding to help all K-12
students in the state reach academic achievement standards. 3 Yet, the
* Clerk to the Honorable E. Grady Jolly, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals; J.D.
2010, The University of Chicago; M.B.A. 2006, California State University, Chico,
B.S. 2004, The University of California Berkeley. Support provided by the Casper
Platt Award, and Olin Fellowship. The author acknowledges the invaluable
guidance of Saul Levmore; helpful comments provided by Dean Lueck, Lisa
Bernstein, Jianlin Chen; and invaluable information provided by numerous wildfire
experts, especially Lloyd Bradshaw and Ron Berryman.
1. See Kate Robertson, A Forest Fire's Price Tag, INVESTOPEDIA (June 8,
2010, 9:46 AM), http://financialedge.investopedia.com/financial-edge/0610/A-
Forest-Fires-Price-Tag.aspx (noting that the size of wildfires has increased
dramatically in the past twenty years).
2. Bettina Boxall, Spending to fight California Wildfires Surpasses $1 Billion:
About 1.4 Acres are Scorched in one of the Worst Fire Seasons in the State's
History, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at C2.
3. Jennifer Imazeki, Assessing the Costs ofK-12 Education in California
Public Schools, STANFORD UNIV. INST. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. POLICY &
PRACTICE (March 2007), http://irepp.stanford.edu/documents/GDF/SUMMARIES/
Imazeki.pdf ( stating that "[t]he cost-function model estimates that California
school districts need up to $1.7 billion more overall to achieve state API goals.").
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destructiveness of wildfire, unlike other natural disasters, can be
substantially lessened and contained through suppression or
firefighting, activity. Public policies, enacted by legislatures and
carried out by government agencies and private actors, have the
potential to dramatically reduce wildfire's incredible ecological costs
and drain on public resources.
Despite the potential for policy changes to produce profound
benefits, little legislative effort has been made to understand or stem
the causes of wildfire spread and funding increases. Similarly, legal
literature has historically ignored the topic of wildfire.4 Wildfire has
only gained note in academia recently, and still only in limited areas
concentrated around clusters of administrative and environmental
law.5 The current level of minimal attention is shocking given the
helpful policy suggestions legal academics could contribute.
4. Wildfire is relatively unstudied in legal literature. See Lauren Wishnie,
Note, Fire and Federalism: A Forest Fire is Always an Emergency, 17 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 1006, 1007 (2008) (commenting that "[d]espite its significant
economic, environmental, and social impacts, the law has surprisingly little to say
about wildfire.") (internal citation omitted).
5. Perhaps because of renewed public attention to wildfire as a result of the
recent dramatic growth in the number and severity of bums annually, this area of
law is experiencing renewed attention. Recent literature addresses wildfire
policies, inter-agency dynamics, and state-federal interplay. See Jamison Colbum,
The Fire Next Time: Land Use Planning in the Wildland/Urban Interface, 28 J.
LAND RES. & ENVTL. L. 223 (2008); Robert B. Keiter, The Law ofFire: Reshaping
Public Land Policy in an Era of Ecology and Litigation, 36 ENVTL. L. 301 (2006)
(exploring wildfire policies); Rebecca K. Smith, War on Wildfire: The U.S. Forest
Service's Wildland Fire Suppression Policy and Its Legal, Scientific, and Political
Context, 15 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 25 (2007) (summarizing the interplay among
federal agencies in wildfire suppression). The majority of material that addresses
the intersection of private interests and wildfire focuses on the roles and incentives
of private homeowners or small landowners in traditionally forested areas. Randal
O'Toole, The Perfect Firestorm: Bringing Forest Service Wildfire Costs Under
Control, 591 POL'Y ANALYSIS 11, 16 (2007) (providing a discussion of wildland
urban interface owners). Little mention is made of the role of institutional private
landowners, although they hold the majority of timberland. See Ross W. GORTE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30755, FOREST FIRE/WILDFIRE PROTECTION 1 n.3
(2008) (noting that "[d]espite the substantial attention given to the [Forest Service]
and [Department of the Interior] agencies, the majority of wildlands are privately
owned."). For a notable exception to the general lack of focus on the incentives of
institutional landowners in reducing the risk of wildfire,see Jonathan Yoder,
Liability, Regulation, and Endogenous Risk: The Incidence and Severity ofEscaped
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This Article seeks to overcome the reticence of legal thinkers to
engage in this unfamiliar but important area by providing a brief
background of the aspects of wildfire most pertinent to legal analysis.
In particular, this Article assesses the incentive structures that guide
the actions of government firefighting suppression agencies, wildland
urban interface owners, and private institutional landowners, who
often have conflicting views on the appropriate treatment of wildfire
suppression efforts.
Section II sets forth a basic overview of the conditions that give
rise to wildfire and the different types of wildfire. Next, Section III
discusses the public and private actors who are most impacted by
wildfire; specifically government land management agencies,
wildfire-urban interface owners, and public institutional landowners.
Section IV examines the damage caused by wildfires and evaluates
the ecological and fiscal costs associated with this damage. Finally,
Section V discusses current issues in wildfire law that demand
thoughtful contributions from legal academics and others in order to
develop sound policy.
Prescribed Fires in the United States, 51 J.L. & ECON. 297 (2008). Yoder's Article
is the first modem piece of legal scholarship to address a form of wildfire using a
law and economics analysis. For an older study on the topic, see also A.A. Dyer et
al., The Role ofPrivate Individuals and Firms, States, and the Federal Government
in Protection of State and Private Lands from Hazards of Wildfire, in SPECIAL
SERIES 1983 (Dep't. of Forest & Wood Sci. Colo. St. U., Ser. 26, 1983). Legal
analysis of specific fire management practices has been limited to clearing land
through the use of mechanical cutting or prescription burning prior to a fire's
occurrence. See, e.g., Robert B. Keiter, Breaking Faith with Nature: The Bush
Administration and Public Land Policy, 27 J. LAND RES. & ENVTL. L. 195 (2007);
Evan N. Turgeon, Federal Forests, Biomass, and Ethanol: Energy Security
Sabotaged, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10140 (2009). Because of the
controversies surrounding timber thinning, this subject represents the most robust
area of legal literature regarding wildfire; the debate was revived by the Healthy
Forests Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-48, 117 Stat. 1887 (codified at 16
U.S.C. §§ 6501-6591). I could not find a prolonged discussion of the specific fire
management practices that occur after a wildfire begins. This paper explores the
topic of backfire, which comprises a subpart of the broad subject of ex post fire
management.
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II. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF WILDFIRE
A. An Overview of Wildfire
Wildfire is best understood as fire occurring on sparsely or
unpopulated land that is not burning at the intention of a responsible
land manager.6 To start a fire, the elements of fuel, heat, and oxygen
must combine. In wildlands, fuel is everywhere: trees, underbrush,
6. Ron Wakimono, Wilderness Fire Policy- "Let It What?", in WILDERNESS
& WILDFIRE 1, 4 (Tom Walsh ed., 1989) (explaining that a wildfire is a wildland
fire that is not designated or managed as a prescribed fire, because it exceeds
specified conditions and/or does not meet stated land management objectives).
In contrast to wildfire, controlled bums, sometimes called prescription fires, are
intentionally set fires that are designed to meet land management objectives. See id.
at 50 (describing a prescribed fire as "any fire [that is] burning under specific, pre-
planned conditions and is meeting pre-determined land management objectives.").
For example, controlled bums may be used to remove slash or control underbrush.
Controlled bums are generally accepted as a tool for sound forest management, and
are widely used by public and private land managers. See BOB GRAY, FORESTS,
FIRES AND WILD THINGS 230 (1985) (providing an example of the Shasta-Trinity
Forest, where more acreage has burned by controlled bums than by wildfire).
Controlled bums, however, can present problems, including damaging clean air and
water supplies, killing animals, and potentially slipping out of control. See Mariel
Garza, Fast Burn-Controlled Burn Policy of the US Forest Service, REASON
MAG., Nov. 1999, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi ml568/
is_6_ 31/ai_56750023/ (noting that "[t]here are the myriad environmental hurdles to
consider [with controlled bums], including rules about clean air and water. There's
also the potential for torching endangered animals. And contrary to their name,
controlled bums aren't all that controllable."). Bob Gray, an experienced fire
expert, described a controlled bum that became uncontrollable and burned 300
acres, including private land and a Forest Service plantation of trees. GRAY, supra
at 232. To monitor and protect against irresponsible use of controlled burns,
government agencies typically require the use of bum permits, and impose
heightened liability for escaped controlled burns. See generally Yoder, supra note
5 (providing an excellent overview of the liability rules surrounding prescription
bums and their efficacy).
7. ELEMENTS OF FIRE, http://www.smokeybear.com/elements-of-fire.asp (last
visited Sept. 23, 2010) (conveying that "[t]he fire triangle is a simple way of
understanding the factors of fire. Each side of the triangle represents one of the
three ingredients needed to have a fire - oxygen, heat, and fuel - demonstrating the
interdependence of these ingredients in creating and sustaining fire. When there is
not enough heat generated to sustain the process, when the fuel is exhausted,
removed, or isolated, or when oxygen supply is limited, then a side of the triangle
is broken and the fire will die.").
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and slash-or vegetative debris-provide excellent fodder for fire.8
Heat can be produced naturally, as with lighting, or by human
activity. Once a fire starts, its continuation depends upon a number
of natural factors. For example, weather plays a crucial role in
determining whether a fire will spread or extinguish. 9 Wildfires can
be started by natural conditions or, more frequently, human action. 10
In recent decades, wildfires have grown significantly in size."
Additionally, fire suppression costs are at a record high. Federal
expenditures on fire fighting rose from $1 billion spent annually prior
to 1997 to more than $3 billion annually after 2003.12 The graph
below shows this dramatic spike in wildfire spending between 1970
8. Wildland Fire Prevention: Fuel Breaks, Fuel Reduction, & Other Tips, THE
COLESTIN RURAL FIRE DIST., http://www.crfd.org/wildlandfireprevention.htm (last
visited Nov. 2, 2010) (noting that property owners can reduce wildfire risk by
eliminating slash, removing dead fuels including vegetation, branches, and trees).
9. A well-recognized "fire season" occurs in which the vast majority of
wildland fires take place due to weather conditions. See Mark J. Schroeder &
Charles C. Buck, Fire Weather: A Guide for Application of Meteorological
Information to Fire Control Operations, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. IV (1970), available
at http://training.nwcg.gov/documents/Fire%20Weather%20Handbook PMS 425-
1.pdf (commenting that "[f]ree-burning fires are literally nourished by weather
elements, atmospheric components, and atmospheric motion.").
10. Enoch Bell et al., Fire Economics Assessment Report 30 (Sept. 1, 1995)
(unpublished report) (claiming that "[i]ncreased human access generally increases
the frequency of wildfire ignitions-88% of the fires from 1988-1997 were caused
by humans, with only 12% caused by lightning. While human-caused fires can be
catastrophic, they are typically in accessible areas, and thus can often be controlled
more quickly; for example, only 48% of the acres burned from 1988-1997 were in
human-caused fires."). Estimates suggest that humans start between 68% to 97%
of all wildfires. See, e.g., Living With Wildfire: A Homeowner's Guide, ROGUE
VALLEY FIRE PREVENTION CO-OP 4 (2008), available at http://www.co.josephine.
or.us/files/wildfire2.pdf (noting that approximately 68% of all wildfires are human-
caused, with lightning and other natural causes being responsible for the rest).
I1. See Robertson, supra note 1 (noting that the size of wildfires has increased
dramatically over the past twenty years).
12. See GORTE, supra note 5 (noting that "the cost of federal fire management is
high and rising. Wildfire appropriations for the FS and DOI totaled less than
$1billion annually prior to FY1997. For FY2003-FY2005, funding was $3 billion
annually."); Steve Pyne, The Wildland/Science Interface, fig. 1 (2009), available at
http://www.public.asu.edu/~spyne/GRAHAM.pdf.
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and 2008, which occurred even though the size of wildfires (depicted
in red) grew at a much slower pace:13
Moreover, the nature of wildfire has changed over time, with fires
becoming larger and more intense;14 some attribute increases in
intensity and severity to global warming.15  Further, changing
firescape patterns leave some regions, such as California, at particular
risk. 16 Coupled with these changes, the government sometimes has
had insufficient resources to fight all fires burning simultaneously,1 7
13. Pyne, supra note 12, at 8.
14. Randal O'Toole, Reforming the Fire Service: An Analysis of Federal Fire
Budgets and Incentives, THE THOREAU INST. 13 (2002), available at
http://www.ti.org/firesvc.pdf (stating that "there is no doubt that forests are
different today than they were a hundred years ago").
15. Kevin C. Ryan, Climate Change, Fire & Natural Vegetation: Implications
for Wilderness Areas, in WILDERNESS & WILDFIRE 1, 18-21 (Tom Walsh ed., 1989)
(noting that the climate change associated with global warming will change fires).
16. Matthew F. Pawa, Global Warming: The Ultimate Public Nuisance, 39
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10230, 10233 (2009) (stating that "[m]ore than
one-half of the most damaging fires in the United States over the past 170 years
have occurred in California, and the state leads the nation in wildfire-related
economic losses," and that "[g]lobal warming will substantially increase the
wildlife damage in California by increasing the number of escaped wildfires,
increasing the area burned by wildfires, and shortening the return period between
wildfires.").
17. Brandon Honig, California Guard Adds Water Trucks to Firefighting
Inventory, THE NAT'L GUARD (Jan. 31, 2009), http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/




MODERN OVERVIEW OF WILDFIRE
requiring agencies to prioritize their allocation of resources including
manpower, equipment, and money.'
III. STAKEHOLDERS IN WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION
Although fire itself seems simple-a mere mix of fuel, heat, and
oxygen-its effect on people, property interests, laws, and the
government agencies involved is stunningly complex.19 This Section
outlines the stakeholders who drive and bear the costs of wildfire
decision-making.
Wildfire profoundly affects a diffuse group of people.20 Wildfire
impacts are particularly concentrated among groups with wildland
property interests whose well-being is directly diminished by the
occurrence of wildfire. More specifically, three groups have property
interests that are directly impacted by wildfire: (1) government land
management agencies, 2' (2) small private landowners,22 and (3)
institutional landowners. 23 These groups often have wildly divergent
land use goals, which also leads to similarly variant interests in
2009/02/020509-firefighter.aspx (noting that there were 1,800 fires burning
simultaneously in California in 2008, burning 1.3 million acres of land).
18. Id. (describing the allocation of manpower and resources for firefighting).
19. See Keiter, supra note 5, at 303-04 (noting "an uncoordinated and
fragmented welter of organic statutory provisions, environmental protection
mandates, annual budget riders, site-specific legislation, judicial decisions, policy
documents, management plans, and diverse state statutory provisions"); Kurt M.
Menning, Practical and Institutional Constraints on Adopting Wide-Scale
Prescribed Burning: Lessons from the Mountains of California, in LIVING ON THE
EDGE: ECONOMIC, INSTITUTIONAL AND MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON WILDFIRE
HAZARD IN THE URBAN INTERFACE 73, 82 (Austin Troy & Roger G. Kennedy eds.,
2007) (stating that "[t]he sociopolitical context around fire-both prescribed and
wild-is increasingly complex."); Wishnie, supra note 4, at 1015 (noting that
"[w]ildland fire management in the United States is beset by considerable
institutional complexity").
20. Gregory Vogt presents compelling first-hand accounts of a wide variety of
people who were impacted by the infamous 1989 Yellowstone wildfire. He
explores the impact of a major wildfire on an area from several different
perspectives. GREGORY VOGT, FORESTS ON FIRE: THE FIGHT TO SAVE OUR TREES,
116-27 (1990).
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.B.
23. See infra Part II.C.
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defining ideal wildfire outcomes.24 This "[1]ack of cooperation means
that neighboring land managers may be making very different and
even conflicting choices about what fire regime to allow."25 This
Section briefly sketches the prevalence and role of each of these
groups in owning land that is at risk of wildfire.
A. Government Land Management Agencies
Government land management agencies control public lands. 26 At
the federal level, the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture,
the Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and
the National Park Service in the Department of the Interior are
responsible for various wildland holdings.27 The wildfire risks facing
28these holdings are shockingly high. Many states have land
management agencies as well. 29 However these various state land
24. For example, small private landowners may care about reducing smoke
around their residences during fires, whereas government land management
agencies might view the fire as a natural occurrence that should be allowed to
continue unchecked.
25. Wishnie, supra note 4, at 1008.
26. BETSY A. CODY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-599 ENR, MAJOR FEDERAL
LAND MANAGEMENT AGENCIES: MANAGING OUR NATION'S LAND AND
RESOURCES, 1 (1995).
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., GORTE, supra note 5, at 9 (citations omitted) (noting that "[iln
1995, the FS estimated that thirty-nine million acres in the National Forest System
(NFS) were at high risk of catastrophic wildfire, and needed some form of fuel
treatment. More recently, the Coarse-Scale Analysis reported that fifty-one million
NFS acres were at high risk of significant ecological damage from wildfire, and
another eighty million acres were at moderate risk. The Coarse-Scale Analysis also
reported twenty-three million acres of Department of the Interior lands at high risk
and 76 million acres at moderate risk. All other lands (calculated as the total shown
in the Coarse-Scale Analysis less the NFS and DOI lands) included 107 million
acres at high risk and 314 million acres at moderate risk of ecological damage.").
29. See DIv. OF FORESTRY, ALASKA DEP'T OF NATURAL RES.,
http://forestry.alaska.gov/fire/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2010) (providing a description
of the interplay between state and federal land management agencies) ("[f]ire
management planning, preparedness, suppression operations, prescribed fire, and
related activities will be coordinated on an interagency basis with the full
involvement of DOF and its state, federal and local government cooperators. The
Division of Forestry, Bureau of Land Management, and the U.S. Forest Service,
fight fires within their protection areas on all land ownerships which reduces the
duplication of facilities and services. None of the agencies in Alaska have all of the
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management agencies operate under differing regimes for fire
suppression than federal agencies. 30 Some federal agencies have a
"let bum" policy, and as a result, conflicts can arise when properties
controlled by agencies with different policies border one another.3 1
The federal government specifies that land management agencies
are responsible for controlling the costs of wildfire. 32  U.S. policy
often focuses upon ex ante fire prevention: steps that can be taken
prior to a fire breaking out. For example, land managers might thin
the trees on their land, reduce slash, and educate the public on
wildfire prevention to reduce the risk and spread of wildfire on their
land. However, these efforts are constrained by significant
environmental pressure and budgetary constraints. 33 Unlike ex ante
resources required to accomplish the fire protection job on their own. The Division
of Forestry has cooperative agreements with the Departments of Agriculture and
Interior, and numerous local government and volunteer fire departments to help get
the job done. The state and federal agencies routinely utilize each other's personnel
and resources to both manage and fight fires. This is efficient and cost effective.").
30. The contrasting suppression goals of state and federal agencies can be seen
via the works of the Nat'l Wildfire Coordinating Grp. (NWCG). See Memorandum
from William Raage, NWCG Chair, to
NWCG Committee Chairs and Geographic Area Coordinating Group (GACG) 4
(July 8, 2010), available at http://www.nwcg.gov/general/memos/nwcg-030-
2010.pdf ( stating that "[w]ith rare exceptions, state ... agencies support and carry
out wildfire suppression programs that provide for rapid and aggressive initial
response to wildfires with the intent of minimizing its spread. Federal agencies
manage wildfires on federal lands considerate of protecting communities and other
state or private resources.").
31. See Don Brunell, California Wildfires Are the Result of a Policy to "Let
Nature Take Its Course" BONNEY LAKE-SUMNER COURIER-HERALD, Aug. 2, 2010,
available at http://www.pnwlocalnews.com/pierce/bch/opinion/99801134.html.
32. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-922T, WILDLAND FIRE:
MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS COULD ENHANCE FEDERAL AGENCIES' EFFORTS TO
CONTAIN THE COSTS OF FIGHTING FIRES 9-10 (2007).
(noting that "the agencies have issued guidance clarifying that land managers, not
fire managers, have primary responsibility for containing wildland fire costs").
33. See DAVID CARLE, BURNING QUESTIONS: AMERICA'S FIGHT WITH
NATURE'S FIRE 248-51 (2002) (describing agencies focus on ex post suppression,
rather than ex ante activity, such as fuel prevention or prescribed burning);
Wishnie, supra note 4, at 1009 ("[f]uel treatment programs often require drawn-
out, expensive analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
while fire suppression activities are exempt from analysis under NEPA's
'emergency exception."') (citation omitted). In response to the increased number
2010] 453
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fire reduction measures that are carried out by land managers, ex post
fire suppression measures carried out by government fire suppression
agencies do not face budgetary constraints.34
This legal shell-game [of shifting funds from other agency
activities to wildfire suppression] has crippled some of the
very projects meant to forestall catastrophic fires by
siphoning off money intended for things such as forest
thinning and equipment purchases. And in the end, only
80% of the overall amount taken from other agencies is
actually repaid, according to the report. Transferring funds
for wildfire suppression resulted in canceled and delayed
projects, strained relationships with state and local agency
partners, and difficulties in managing programs .... These
impacts affected numerous activities including fuels
reduction (the clearing of dead wood and brush in forests)
and land acquisition. 35
After a fire, rules governing land management practices are
substantially relaxed.36 Such relaxation creates considerable
incentives to shift fire suppression from an ex ante activity (which
federal policy dictates should be employed) to an ex post activity.
Thus, because no system of accountability exists for land manager
fire suppression efforts, these perverse incentives are not offset by
and level of wildfires, legislation is being promoted to reduce hazardous fuels and
thus reduce the risk and spread of wildfire. California Catastrophic Wildfire
Prevention and Community Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 2899, 111th Cong.
(2009).
34. Brock N. Meeks, Fight Against Wildfires Chronically Underfunded,
MSNBC.coM (June 15, 2004, 6:51 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5175836/.
(stating that the "[t]he federal land agencies, and especially the Forest Service, have
a blank check to put out fires and thus have no reason to control their costs, . .
35. Id.
36. See Melanie Stidham et al., The Role of Economic Emergency Situation
Determinations in Expediting Fire Salvage, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10741, 10742 (2008) (providing a description of the incentive to harvest federal
lands that have been burned by wildfire).
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sanctions, there is no generally-used measure against which fire
management costs are measured.37
1.Firefighting Responsibility Is Clear; Appropriate Prioritization
Is Not
Wildland agencies at the federal and state level divide fire
suppression responsibility in a complicated system of agreements in
which responsibility is assigned for covering public and private lands
within particular regions. 38 Agencies reimburse one another for fire
suppression efforts that cross jurisdictions. 39 Federally, firefighting
has replaced land management as the core competency for the Forest
40Service. In turn, the Forest Service has reallocated funds from other
areas to fund fire suppression efforts.4 1
Agency managers issue policies guiding on-the-ground personnel
in prioritizing competing demands for fire suppression.42 The order of
37. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 32, at 10 (noting how
"[a]gencies have yet to establish a clear measure to evaluate the benefits and costs
of alternative firefighting strategies. Some past studies have concluded that the
absence of such a measure fundamentally weakens the agencies' ability to provide
effective oversight.").
38. See, e.g., A Primer: California's Wildfire Protection System, CAL. LEGIS.
ANALYST'S OFFICE (Apr. 12, 2005), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005
/fireprotection/051205_fireprotection.htm. (providing a discussion and diagram
of state and federal responsibility areas for wildfire suppression). For an overview
of the importance of suppression agreements among agencies, see Wildfire
Protection & Suppression, COLO. STATE FOREST SERV. COLO. STATE UNIV.,
http://csfs.colostate.edu/pages/wf-suppression.html (last visited September 23,
2010) (commenting that "[w]ildfire protection within Colorado cannot be
accomplished by any single agency. Cooperation and coordination between all
agencies is key to effective suppression.").
39. See Wildfire Protection & Suppression, supra note 38.
40. See Reforming the Fire Service, supra note 14, at 1 (describing a shift in the
mission of the Forest Service from the national timber program to responding to
severe fires).
41. Id. at 13. (conveying that "...the chief directed the agency to stop land
acquisitions, construction projects, and purchases of motor vehicles, computers,
and other items so that the money dedicated to those programs could be spent
fighting fires instead.").
42. These teams are referred to as incident command teams, and are tasked with
coordinating strategy and tactical decision-making in wildfire suppression. See
Montrose District Wildfire Protection and Management, COLO. STATE FOREST
4552010]
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priorities in government fire suppression is "life, property, and
resources"4 3 and "property" is not interpreted as including timbered
44land, regardless of the value of the timber to its commercial owner.
This definition is instead limited to structures, primarily homes. 45 The
anomalous result is that hundreds of acres of timberland can be
allowed to bum to save a single, unoccupied home.46 This situation
occurs with increasing frequency due to changing land use patterns as
homeowners increasingly build in areas which were once purely
forested.47 The increasing costs of fire suppression can thus be
partially attributed to the increase of wildlife-urban interface areas
48which are a product of new land use patterns.
Prioritization of firefighting resources is difficult, 49 but policies can
be flexible in response to emerging circumstances. For example, in
1994, a series of fires diverted resources from protecting federal
lands toward protecting wildland-urban interface homes and
communities.o In response, a report was issued that "altered federal
SERV. COLO. STATE UNIV., http://csfs.colostate.edu/pages/montrose-wildfire.html
(last visited September 23, 2010) (providing a description of an incident
management team).
43. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FIRE SUPPRESSION COSTS ON LARGE
FIRES: A REVIEW OF THE 1994 FIRE SEASON, 13-14 (1995).
44. See GORTE, supra note 5, at 6 (stating that "[m]ost observers agree that
protecting homes and other structures in the interface is an appropriate goal for
safeguarding the highest values at risk from wildfire.").
45. Id.
46. An example of summer homes being prioritized above high commercial
timber values can be found in the case of Teegarden v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl.
252 (1998) (quoting a letter from a Forest Supervisor that stated: "[fjirefighter
safety is your first priority. Your second priority is the protection of life and
property. Mammoth Creek is a significant summer home area, and the spread of
the fire there must be prevented. Structural protection may be required. The fire is
in an area of high commercial timber values. Third priority is to keep burned
acreage to a minimum.").
47. Reforming the Fire Service, supra note 14, at 16 (noting that "[a] major
reason for the increasing costs of fire suppression is the growing number of homes
built near federal lands in what is called the wildland-urban interface.").
48. See e.g., id. (noting that a major reason for the increasing costs of fire
suppression is the presence of homes in the wildland-urban interface).
49. Wishnie, supra note 4, at 1008. (observing that "[flire management involves
hard choices with regard to use prioritization.").
50. GORTE, supra note 5, at 3 (commenting that during the 1994 fires, federal
officials observed that firefighting resources were diverted to protecting nearby
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fire policy from priority for private property to equal priority for
private property and federal resources, based on values at risk."51
An additional concern is that government agencies must make
difficult decisions under exigent circumstances.52 In times of severe
fires, they must quickly decide which areas to suppress and which to
let burn. Within an individual fire, they must decide which among
several assets to protect and what firefighting methodologies to use.
private residences and communities at a cost to federal lands and resources); see
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FED. WILDLAND FIRE MGMT.
POLICY & PROGRAM REVIEW: FINAL REPORT (1995), available at
http://www.nwcg.gov/branches/ppm/fpc/archives/firepolicy/mission/1995_fedwi
Idland firejpolicyprogram-report.pdf.
51. GORTE, supra note 5, at 3.
52. For a detailed account of wildfire suppression prioritization decisions, see
Miller v. United States, 163 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing the factual
circumstances underlying the case) ("[w]hen lightning strikes the dry forests of
eastern Oregon in August, fire follows. After ninety days with no rain and with
temperatures above normal, a thunderstorm ignited several fires on the Snow
Mountain Ranger District ("SMRD") of the Ochoco National Forest on August 6,
1990. Les Holsapple, the fire management officer for the SMRD, first spotted the
fire that damaged the Miller's property ("the Bald Butte fire") around 7:00 p.m. In
the course of that hour, several other fires were reported on the SMRD. Within
fifteen minutes, Holsapple ordered aerial fire retardants and smokejumpers for the
Bald Butte fire but was informed that retardant aircraft had already been committed
to a fire in the Deschutes National Forest and that smokejumpers would be unable
to reach the area before dark. Fire engines and bull dozers were ordered, along
with other equipment available under equipment rental agreements. The four fire
engines owned by the SMRD were all committed to other fires in the district, and
Holsapple directed Dick Smith, the assistant Fire Management Officer who took
over the initial attack on the fires, that direct ground-based attack on the Bald Butte
fire would be ineffective given its current intensity levels and that they should find
and suppress any other small fires before those fires created a problem. At that
time the Bald Butte fire covered approximately 700-1,000 acres. The Bald Butte
fire was soon declared "escaped," and Holsapple advised the district ranger that it
was unsafe to commit resources to the fire at that time. Smith went on to lead
efforts to attack another fire on the SMRD, the Buck Springs fire. Although
monitoring and suppression planning efforts for the Bald Butte fire were ongoing,
on-the-ground fire suppression efforts did not occur until sometime on the
afternoon of August 7, 1990, seventeen to twenty-three hours after the Bald Butte
fire was first sited (sic). The Bald Butte fire soon joined two other fires, for a total
size of approximately 6,000 acres. This coalescence of fires crossed onto the
Millers' property sometime on the afternoon of August 9, 1990.").
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A surprising number of factors correlate with, or contribute to, the
efficacy of fire suppression efforts.53
Fire science is inexact: no formulaic approach has been proven to
consistently produce the best suppression result. Computerized
firefighting models exist, 54 but they are largely unused in practice.55
Therefore, the choice of which suppression tool to use is made by
incident teamS56 -firefighting leadership groups that control strategic
choices based upon their experience.57 Firefighting decision-makers
rely heavily upon institutional knowledge, informal, unwritten, and
shared information of how best to approach a situation based upon
58past experience. This knowledge is developed through learning
from past wildfires, as well as learning from controlled burns. 59
Given the inexact nature of fire management, it is difficult to
analyze the decisions made under exigent circumstances. George
53. Many of the factors influencing wildfire suppression efforts have not been
formally studied, as fire science is a field grounded largely in institutional
knowledge. See infra Section III. There are, however, individual studies showing
correlations between the fire tools used and number of large fires in a particular
year. See, e.g., NORMAN MACLEAN, YOUNG MEN AND FIRE 24-25 (1992)
(describing that the number of large fires corresponds to the availability of
smokejumpers). Further, it has been suggested that ease of communication when
responding to exigent wildfire circumstances is beneficial to suppression efforts.
See generally GARY CRAVEN GRAY, RADIO FOR THE FIRELINE, A HISTORY OF
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION IN THE FOREST SERVICE 1905-1975 (1982).
54. For a description of simulated wildfire computer models, see Fire Wars:
Description of "Wildfire Simulator, " NOVA ONLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
nova/fire/simu text.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).
55. See, e.g., Marc Ambinder, The Fires This Time: Joe Flood on Managing
New York City, THE ATLANTIC (May 13, 2010), available at http://www.theatlantic
.com/politics/archive/2010/05/the-fires-this-time-joe-flood-on-managing-new-york-
city/56682/ (describing skepticism towards computer models used for firefighting).
56. See Montrose District Wildfire Protection and Management, supra note 42.
57. See GORTE, supra note 5, at i ("However, past experience with wildfires are
of limited value for building predictive models, and research on fire behavior under
various circumstances is difficult, at best. Thus, predictive tools for fire protection
and control are often based on expert opinion and anecdotes, rather than on
research evidence.").
58. Id.
59. See GRAY, supra note 6, at 231 (explaining that "[f]irefighters learn more
about fire behavior from these controlled burns than they ever could in a fire
behavior class, getting a grandstand view on the effect of wind, slope and fuel types
on fire.").
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Nickas explained the balancing in which firefighting teams must
engage when reaching prioritization decisions:
Is it appropriate to attempt to suppress a fire that might
burn for weeks in a twenty thousand acre wilderness
drainage in order to protect a private cabin on a twenty acre
inholding? Is it okay to control a fire in wilderness to
reduce the likelihood it will burn up an adjacent timber
stand, and should it make a difference if the timber stand is
on private or public land? What responsibilities, both legal
and ethical, do land managers have to protect private
interests from natural events? 60
Further, no clear guidance or external accountability exists for fire
suppression managers who make these difficult prioritization choices,
and internal examinations unsurprisingly result in few recriminating
judgments about the decisions made.
2.The Funding Structure For Firefighting Encourages
Government Agencies To Allow Fires To Grow
Current funding policies for Government Firefighting Agencies
("GFA"s) provide perverse incentives for firefighters to allow
wildfires to grow larger and consume greater resources:
"[e]ssentially ... the resources available for wildland fire suppression
are unlimited, and thus normal economic analysis is inapplicable." 61
A government report found that firefighters viewed funds from
emergency supplemental appropriations to be "free money" that was
available if fires were allowed to grow particularly large. 62 The result
is "wasting federal firefighting funds, which [one critic] calls 'fire
60. George Nickas, Preserving and Enduring Wilderness: Challenges and
Threats to the National Wilderness Preservation System, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 449,
457 (1999).
61. Wishnie, supra note 4, at 1033 (citing STEPHEN J. PYNE ET AL.,
INTRODUCTION TO WILDLAND FIRE 434 (2d ed. 1996)).
62. See GORTE, supra note 5, at 16 (illustrating that "[o]ne critic has observed
that emergency supplemental appropriations, to replenish funds borrowed from
other accounts to pay for firefighting, are viewed by agency employees as 'free
money."').
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boondoggles."' 63 Firefighting agencies also profit when more fires
occur.64 This leads to inadequate ex ante fire management practices
and inadequate ex post fire suppression efforts.
One example of the impact incentives can have on firefighting
practice can be seen where firefighters are financially encouraged to
allow suppressible fires to build towards a conflagration; a large
media-worthy fire also called a "campaign" fire, 65 in order to receive
increased media attention and emergency appropriations.66
Conflagration presents emergency conditions which allow agencies
to apply for emergency supplemental appropriations. 67 Commentators
have criticized the current funding structure and have argued for
change, stating that "[f]unding structures for wildland fire
management should be restructured to remove incentives to wait for
the conflagration." 68 Firefighters are not forced to internalize the
damage caused to private land and receive little negative media
attention for failing to protect institutional landowners. 69
B. Wildland-Urban Interface Owners
The land use pattern of residential homes in areas traditionally used
as forests or wildland is described as the "wildland-urban
interface."70 For the purposes of this Article, I define wildland-urban
interface owners as parties who own homes or small amounts of land
(less than 5,000 acres) in areas that are highly susceptible to wildfire.
Construction of private residences in wildland-urban interface areas
63. Id.
64. PYNE ET AL., supra note 61, at 434 (remarking that "[p]rograms with a large
number of wildfires pay for themselves in ways that successful programs of fire
prevention or prescribed burning do not.")
65. See Wishnie, supra note 4, at 1033.
66. See id. at 1009, 1033-34.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 1009-10.
69. See Reforming the Fire Service, supra note 14, at 10 (observing that "[f]ire
managers do not lose their jobs for pouring massive resources into fire suppression,
or even for burning down someone's home if it is done in the course of a backfire
aimed at stopping a wildfire.").
70. GORTE, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that "[t]he wildland-urban interface has
been defined as the area where combustible homes meet combustible vegetation")
(internal quotations omitted).
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has increased over the past two decades.7 ' The influx of people into
traditionally forested areas increases the risk of wildfire reaching
people and homes. 72
The potential devastation caused by wildfire to wildland-urban
interface owners is, on an individual level, catastrophic. Fire can
destroy homes, which often represents the largest asset for a majority
of homeowners.73 Although this financial loss is not large when
compared to the damage to timber values, the percentage loss to a
homeowner as compared to an institutional private landowner is
tremendous. That is to say that the proportional share of devastating
loss is greater for a homeowner than an institutional landowner.74 On
the other hand, the aggregate loss experienced by wildland-urban
interface owners in any given fire may be less than the aggregate loss
experienced by government land management agencies or
institutional landowners.
In addition to lost home value, homeowners also face numerous
additional losses. They may be forced to evacuate in order to avoid
75
wildfire, be subjected to smoke-affected air or water systems, or
experience economic downfall in their communities 7 6 because of a
catastrophic fire. When describing these impacts, one expert
explained: "[H]uman lives are altered. Big fires, beyond the ecology
71. See id. (noting that "[w]hile this situation has always existed to some extent,
subdivisions in wildland settings appear to have grown significantly over the past
two decades.").
72. See id. at 5 (stating that"[p]eople have increasingly been building their
houses and subdivisions in forests and other wildlands, and this expanding
wildland-urban interface has increased the wildfire threat to people and houses.").
73. See Wealth and Asset Ownership , U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census
.gov/hhes/www/wealth/2004/wlthO4-1.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2010) (providing
a breakdown of average asset holdings by household).
74. For a private landowner, the proportional share of damage can be
understood as the ratio of: amount of property damaged/ total amount of property
owned. For the typical wildland-urban interface property owner, the denominator
and numerator are both one, showing 100% of their property is damaged by the
fire. In contrast, it is unlikely that 100% of the acreage owned by an institutional
land owner-defined as having more than 5,000 acres-is damaged in a single fire.
75. See GORTE, supra note 5, at 18 (discussing the potential effects wildfires
can have on water systems);
Wishnie, supra note 4, at 1012 (noting the impact wildfires can have on air
quality).
76. See GORTE, supra note 5, at 18.
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of a forest, destroy homes, injure and kill people and alter the local
economy."77  Despite these obvious downsides, the growth and
prevalence of persons willing to assume the risk of wildfire suggest
that the benefits of living in a wildland-urban interface area must
overwhelm the potential fire damage for some actors. In addition to
the unique natural beauty of these settings, the availability to receive
full insurance at a rate not reflective of the entire risk assumed likely
contributes to homeowners' willingness to assume the risk of
wildfire.
1.Wildland-Urban Interface Owners Typically Only Have Ex-
Ante Obligations For Fire Management
Although wildland-urban interface property managers do not have
any ex post obligations to suppress fire, they are sometimes
responsible for ex ante fire protection efforts. To encourage loss
reduction among homeowners, fire departments heavily emphasize
the need for homeowners to proactively protect their properties.
Simple actions, such as reducing vegetation near homes or storing
firewood away from structures, can be remarkably effective in
reducing the risk of damage if a fire reaches a home.79
Despite the efficacy of these relatively inexpensive protective
measures, many wildland-urban interface owners do not take
appropriate precautions. To counteract this, some states impose
increased liability against wildland-urban interface owners who do
80
not engage in appropriate vegetation clearing practices. Private
77. VOGT, supra note 20, at 115.
78. See GORTE, supra note 5, at 20.
79. Id. at 6 (remarking that "[t]he characteristics of the structure and their
immediate surroundings are the primary determinants of whether a structure bums.
In particular, non-flammable roofs and cleared vegetation for at least ten meters
(thirty-three feet) and up to forty meters (130 feet) around the structure is highly
likely to protect the structure from wildfire, even when neighboring structures
burn.").
80. The Oregon Forestland-Urban Interface Fire Protection Act of 1997 permits
a state to collect up to $100,000 in suppression costs from a WUI (wildland-urban
interface) landowner if three criteria are met: (1) A wildland fire originates on the
owner's property, (2) the fire spreads within the protection zone around a structure
and driveway that does not meet the [fuel-reduction] standards; and (3) Oregon
Department of Forestry incurs extraordinary costs to suppress the fire. The cost
collection may be greater than $100,000 if a WUI landowner is found to be
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insurance companies are also becoming proactive in ex post fire
suppression efforts by hiring private firefighting companies to protect
properties after a fire starts and a property is at risk, but before the
fire reaches the wildland-urban interface property.8'
2. Wildland-Urban Interface Properties Are Overprotected From An
Economic Perspective
Wildland-urban interface residents receive more protection against
wildfires than is economically efficient. Protection comes in two
forms: (1) suppression efforts by GFAs, and (2) insurance structures
that shield wildland-urban homeowners from the risks that they
assume from living in areas with high fire risks.
Protecting structures from fire damage is often not cost-justified,
based solely on government expenditure. GFAs give structures higher
protection priority than alternative assets.82 "Property" is interpreted
as structures-not land, regardless of their relative values. Thus,
the result can be the overprotection of structures. A 2003 government
report states, "[iln some western areas, the government pays more in
suppressing fires than the fair market value of the structures
threatened by those fires. It would literally be cheaper to let the fires
burn and pay 100% of the rebuilding cost." 84 Other commentators
agree that federal firefighting agencies are "[willing] to spend
millions to protect homes that may only be worth thousands."85
This overprotection is fueled by intense public scrutiny and media
coverage.86 It leads to a situation where "[fjire commanders say that
negligent in the origin of the fire. Tod Hunt, Living With Wildfire: A Homeowner's
Guide: Jackson/Josephine County Integrated Fire Plans, FIRST AM. TITLE INS. CO.
OF OR., http://www.co.josephine.or.us/files/fire-county jcifp~booklet.pdf. (last
visited Nov. 7, 2010).
81. See generally, Malia Wollan, Wildfires Bring Demand for Private
Firefighters, U.S.A. TODAY, July 15, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news
/nation/2008-07-15-1 3 6 8 5 18548 x.htm.
82. See GORTE, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that "[m]ost observers agree that
protecting homes and other structures in the interface is an appropriate goal for
safeguarding the highest values at risk from wildfire.").
83. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, 66-67 (2002).
84. Id. at 66.
85. O'Toole, supra note 5 at 11.
86. Reforming the Fire Service, supra note 14, at 14.
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they sometimes 'have to sacrifice control of the wildfire to defend
buildings.' 87 A representative for firefighters publicly acknowledged
this, stating, "[o]ften we use resources because of the public and
political pressure to do something, even though it has no effect on the
fire and is an economic waste." Similarly, insurance overprotects
homeowners in wildland-urban interface areas.
[t]he role of the insurance sector can also prove important
in providing incentives for adaptive measures. For
example, there are proven construction methods and
materials known to reduce fire risk for homes in areas
subject to risks from wildfires. However the availability of
federal disaster assistance has reduced the incentives for
insurance companies to adjust premiums and condition the
availability of coverage for homeowners adopting these
measures.89
The result is that insurers are deterred from requiring that
homebuilders in wildland-urban interface areas use fire safe
materials. 90 Further, homeowners do not fully internalize the risks of
living in dangerous high fire risk areas because the government
requires insurance companies to provide artificially-lowered
insurance rates for primary residences in high fire areas.91 This
87. Id. at 16 (quoting Gary 0. Tokle, The Wildland/Urban Interface in 2025, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON WILDLAND FIRE 2000, at 49 (James B. Davis
& Robert E. Martin eds., 1987)).
88. Timothy Ingalsbee, Money to Burn: The Economics of Fire and Fuels
Management, Part One: Fire Suppression, W. FIRE ECOLOGY CTR./AMER. LAND
ALLIANCE 1, 4 (2000) (quoting Richard Mangan, Fire Program Leader, U.S. Forest
Serv., presentation at the Symposium on Fire Econ.: Planning and Policy Bottom
Lines (Apr. 6, 1999)).
89. Richenda Connell et al., Evaluating the Private Sector Perspective on the
Financial Risks of Climate Change, 15 HASTINGS W.-N.w. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
133, 138-39 (2009).
90. See GORTE, supra note 5 (noting that insurance distorts incentives away
from insurers requiring the maximum use of fire-safe materials for homebuilders).
91. Kevin Ramakrishna, Subduing the Ceaseless Storm: Breaking the Build-
Destroy-Rebuild Cycle Following Major Catastrophes through Taxation and
Responsibility, 2 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 328, 335 (2009).
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insurance is not priced according to the risk,92 and has led to a "build-
destroy-rebuild cycle" in which the wildland-urban interface owner's
loss is subsidized by government insurance schemes. 93 In response,
some insurance companies send privatized firefighting teams to
protect the homes that they insure when GFAs are unable to do so. 94
C. Institutional Private Landowners
For the purposes of this Article, I define institutional private
landowners are non-governmental actors who own at least 5,000
acres of forested wildland. This ownership structure may include
individuals, trusts, partnerships, or corporations. The role of
institutional private landowners in wildfires is virtually unstudied. 95
This lack of attention is surprising because the majority of timberland
in the United States, and therefore the majority of property affected
by wildfire, is held by private institutional landowners.96 Roughly
809.5 million acres of private forests and rangelands exist in the
coterminous forty-eight states, as compared to 426.1 million acres of
all federal lands in those states.97 Thus, studies of wildfire policy
have, in effect, ignored the 800-pound gorilla in the room.
Private institutional landowners can be significantly affected by
backfire. Profit generation through timber harvest is often a key
component of the private land value. As such, backfire destroys a
portion of the profit generator for private institutional landowners.
These losses are generated through the scorching of mature
marketable timber, and other less obvious, sources discussed below. 98
92. Id. at 355.
93. Id. at 329 (stating that no national policy exists to break the "build-destroy-
rebuild cycle" created by government-sponsored homeowner's insurance schemes
associated with homes that are built in areas with a frequent occurrence of natural
disaster, including wildfires).
94. See Wollan, supra note 81.
95. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
96. GORTE, supra note 5, at 1 (staying that "[d]espite the substantial attention
given to the FS [Forest Service] and DOI [Department of the Interior] agencies, the
majority of wildlands are privately owned").
97. Id. at n.3.
98. See infra Part III.
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1.Institutional Landowners Internalize The Damage Caused By
Fire, And Thus Undertake Extensive Precautions Against The
Spread Of Wildfire On Their Property
Institutional landowners take substantial ex ante precaution against
wildfire. Because they do not carry insurance, 99 institutional
landowners fully internalize the loss caused by wildfire.
Consequently, they make decisions on large issues such as engaging
in timber harvest practices to reduce the potential for wildfire.' 00
Although these efforts may arguably produce undesirable collateral
effects of increasing the risk of fire, 101 the willingness of institutional
land managers to invest in substantial ex ante protection against fire
illustrates that they do not have the moral hazard toward fire that is
seen among wildland-urban interface owners.
IV. THE COSTS OF WILDFIRE
To properly understand the costs associated with wildfire it is
helpful to categorize the variety of losses caused by wildfire. This
Section presents a modernized framework similar to that presented in
the 1946 work Fire in the Forests of the United States. 102 This
Section categorizes the damage to property'03 along the dimensions
99. A 1947 forestry textbook explained that forestry companies in the United
States uniformly do not carry insurance against losses due to wildfire although the
rate of loss is higher than that used in other insurable fields. Practices are similar in
other countries surveyed, with the exception of Scandinavian nations. HERMAN H.
CHAPMAN & WALTER H. MEYER, FOREST VALUATION: WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS
ON BASIC ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 346-49 (1947).
100. See GORTE, supra note 5, at 15 (stating that "[a]Another possibility is to
significantly change the traditional approach to timber sales. Stewardship
contracting, in various forms, has been tested in various national forests. . . . Some
observers believe that such alternative approaches could lead to development of an
industry based on small diameter wood, and thus significantly reduce the cost of
fuel management.").
101. See id. (describing that timber harvest and the building of straight roads may
reduce the risk of conflagration in some ways, but may increase risk in others).
102. A.D. FOLWEILER & A.A. BROWN, FIRE IN THE FORESTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1946).
103. I do not consider costs other than value to the land, such as suppression
costs, and fixed business costs, which are outside the framework for just
compensation.
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of (a) lost stumpage value, (b) infrastructure damage (c) retarded tree
growth, (d) waterway and soil composition and productivity, (e)
disease and insect damage (f) human activity and mortality, and (g)
wildlife losses.
A. Stumpage Value
An obvious cost of wildfire is the financial loss of stumpage, the
industry's term describing the value of mature, marketable trees.104
Although some burned timber can be harvested and sold, it is far less
valuable than timber that has not been burned.105 Further, wildfire
typically bums large swaths of timber, the sheer amount of which
produces market dynamics that are unfavorable to private
landowners. 106 In non-fire conditions foresters harvest according to
prevailing market prices.' 07 Unlike typical tree stands, burned timber
cannot wait indefinitely for market prices to reach an acceptable
level; it must be harvested before it begins to rot or is diseased.108
This time pressure results in a glut of damaged timber on the log-
selling market after a heavy fire season. 10 9 Similarly, if multiple
properties experience wildfire, the costs associated with removing the
timber, such as manpower or rental of heavy equipment from logging
104. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, 1331 (3d coll. ed. 1988) (defining
"stumpage" as: "1 standing timber or its value; 2 the right to cut such timber.").
105. Alix Rogstad, Recovering from Wildfire. A Guide for Arizona's Forest
Owners, UNIV. OF ARIZ., Coop. EXTENSION, COLL. OF AGRIC. & LIFE SCI. (2002),
available at http://ag.arizona.edu/pubs/natresources/azl294/.
106. See id.
107. See generally Michael Jacobson, To Cut or Not to Cut: Tree Value and
Deciding When to Harvest Timber, PENN ST., COLL. OF AGRIC. SCIs., AGRIC.
RESEARCH & COOP. EXTENSION (2008), available at http://mrext.cas.psu.edu/PDFs/
uhl88.pdf. Whereas corn or almonds may lose virtually all value if allowed to sit
for a few extra months, healthy timber stands can continue to grow for years (while
waiting for an increase in prices) and appreciate in value. See id. at 2-3. Unlike
other crops, timber does not have to be harvested in a particular season. See
ANDREW S. FULLER, PRACTICAL FORESTRY 72 (1884).
108. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States, 92 F.3d 1148, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(noting "that to have delayed salvage operations would have resulted in further
losses, for damaged trees are vulnerable to disease.").
109. See GORTE, supra note 5, at 18 (remarking that "e[]xtensive fire damage to
trees can significantly alter the timber supply . . . through a short-term glut from
timber salvage . . . .").
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contractors increases due to the increase in demand, which in turn
further reduces the profit margin for landowners.
B. Infrastructure Damage
Backfire causes damage to the infrastructure of land management
operations- buildings and equipment may be burned. The unique
nature of outdoor business occupations mandates that unusually
valuable equipment be stored in remote areas, the value of which can
be surprising. 0 As a result, wildfire can destroy many of the capital
investments of an outdoor business operation."' Such damage is
incurred by landowners in forest settings when their helicopters,
bulldozers, water trucks, and storage facilities are damaged or
destroyed.112 Also, at any given time, a timber operation may have
millions of dollars in timber harvest equipment on the ground. 1 3 In
the unlikely event that wildfire strikes this equipment may be lost.
Further, firefighting operations can cause damage to privately-
owned road systems or fences. In Dovenberg v. U.S. ex rel. U.S.
Forest Service,114 the United States Forest Service used the plaintiff's
land as a base of operations for fighting the Shake Table Complex
Fire."15 Dovenberg provides a compelling description of how land
can be heavily used and damaged by government firefighting
operations:
[i]n response to the fire's expansion onto Mr. Dovenberg's
property, the IMT [Incident Management Team] set up a
110. See, e.g., Thune v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 921, 922 (D. Wyo. 1995)
(describing a United States Forest Service controlled burn that grew out of control
and became a wildfire in the Bridger-Teton National Forest). In Thune, the
plaintiff, who ran a small business guiding hunters, maintained a base camp where
he stored his hunting gear. Id. at 923. The base camp containing the plaintiffs
capital investments in his business were entirely destroyed by the wildfire. Id.
111. See, e.g., id.
112. See generally Bob Zybach et al., U.S. Wildfire Cost-Plus-Loss Economics
Project: The "One-Pager" Checklist, WILDLAND FIRE LESSONs LEARNED CENTER
(2009), available at http://www.wildfirelessons.net/uploads/WildfireEconomics_
LongLpdf.pdf (stressing that the collateral damage associated with wildfires is
both statistically significant and underreported).
113. Id.
114. No. CV 08-0889-MO, 2009 WL 3756370 (D. Or. 2009).
115. Id. at *1.
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staging area near the entrance to the Ranch. The team also
used roads on Mr. Dovenberg's property to access the fire
and to construct a Safety Zone, Drop Points, and a Dozer
Line. His roads provided primary access to the fire and
were used by up to 1500 firefighters and staff personnel
during the four days when the fire remained out of control.
The IMT continued to use the Ranch to access the fire area
for approximately two weeks following control of the fire.
Mr. Dovenberg asserts that the team's use of the Ranch
resulted in the destruction of roads, culverts and fencing,
the clearing of areas for staging, the Safety Zone, Drop
Points, and the Dozer Line. Mr. Dovenberg submitted a
claim for damages to defendant United States on March 13,
2007, which was denied nearly a year later.116
The costs of an incident management team situating on a property
to manage a fire can impose substantial costs on privately-owned
road systems, fencing, etc.
C. Tree Growth
Wildfire also significantly retards tree growth.'"7 A forest has trees
in every phase of the timber life cycle; from seeds germinating, to
seedlings, to saplings, to poles, to standards. Trees at every point in
the life cycle reflect the future income stream of the timber
operator.' 18 Fire damage represents a loss in net present value of that
income stream. Trees which have grown to the seedling and sapling
stages may be damaged or killed by wildfire. The number of trees
killed is not immediately obvious. ". . . [a]pproximately six months
[are] necessary to determine the final mortality due to the fire."ll9
The growth of trees that survive a wildfire is retarded as a result of
having been scarred in the fire. 120
116. Id.
117. See FOLWEILER, supra note 102 at 20.
118. In many cases damage to important commercial hardwoods is concealed and
not discoverable until cutting through the bark. Id. at 25 (noting that "[flire damage
is insidious because so often the new lesions are concealed by dead bark.").
119. Id. at 16.
120. Id. at 20.
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The extent to which fire damage effects mechanisms influencing
growth are not fully known, but some specific sources of damage
have been identified: "[t]here is a reduction in the number of vessels
that are needed by the tree in carrying on physiological functions
such as transporting raw materials from the soil to the leaves. The
mechanical properties of the trees are also affected."'21 Such damage
may be hard to prove until several years after the fire occurs or, in the
area of tree rings, until after the tree is cut. The costs of seed loss and
retarded growth caused in a specific setting by wildfire is difficult to
quantify, particularly within a five year period after a fire.
D. Water And Soil Composition And Productivity
Wildfire changes the forest landscape in other more subtle ways.
Important shifts in the soil composition and waterways effect future
growth among trees and other organisms. "When the protective
mantle of green leaves or needles and the forest debris commonly
referred to as litter and humus are removed by fire, the result is
reflected in the soil. ...
In some forests, the soil, badly damaged by wildfire, is so poor that
trees cannot grow regardless of the replanting efforts taken.123
Similarly, waterways vital to forest health are damaged by
wildfire.12 4 Burned watersheds have less ability to cut down runoff,
and in the absence of forest cover, a watershed supplying water to a
dam may be prone to rapid.125 The silting and inability to stem runoff
can cause flooding among saplings, or damage aquatic life in the
watershed.126
121. Id. at 25.
122. Id. at 21 (commenting that "[w]here frequent fires occur, the Ao horizon is
absent because the forest litter is burned before it can be decomposed by slow-
acting micro-organisms. The absence of the Ao horizon prevents micro and macro-
organisms from living and thus causes the surface soil to be relatively impervious,
thereby reducing percolation, and increasing runoff and attendant erosion.") Id. at
23.
123. Id. at 23 (noting that where there is frequent fire among redwoods, "the soil
conditions have become so badly damaged that even planted redwood seedlings
have difficulty in surviving. It is impossible for natural redwood reproduction to
become established on sites that have been burned repeatedly.").
124. Id. at 21.
125. See id.
126. See id at 23.
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E. Disease And Insects
A fire-damaged landscape gives rise to increased disease among,
and insect attack against, trees. Fire puts trees at risk by damaging
their natural defense mechanisms.127 A tree's natural defense
mechanisms are especially vulnerable if the tree is exposed to
repeated fire.128  But, the extent of damage is not immediately
obvious. "Fire damage is insidious because so often the new lesions
are concealed by dead bark ... Symptoms of dead cambium may not
be apparent for several years after the fire." 29 Trees damaged by
disease and insect attack have far less value than their healthy
counterparts.130 Further, disease and insects spread rapidly from
unhealthy (burned) trees to the healthy counterparts, without
appropriate management.'31
F. Human Activity
Wildfire also has a detrimental impact on human lives. Among
commercial land managers, wildfire diverts man power from timber
operations to wildfire fighting activities. 132 Smoke conditions from
nearby wildfires can impact workers' ability to be outside. Mitigation
and restoration efforts can consume an entire workforce of foresters
and contractors for several months.' 33 Wildfire can also devastate
landowners and their employees, area residents, foresters, ecologists,
nearby business owners, firefighters, tourists, environmentalists,
127. Id. at 24 (noting that "[u]nless a tree is injured in some way so that the
cambium layer is broken, spores of wood-rotting diseases seldom gain entrance.
When the protective bark tissue is removed by fire, spores are able to gain entrance
and commence their damaging work.").
128. Id.
129. Id. at 25.
130. Rogstad, supra note 105 (noting depressed value of burned trees, and that in
some areas markets may not even existed for burned timber).
131. Id.
132. GORTE, supra note 5, at 23 (noting that foresters are used as stand-in
firefighters during wildfire).
133. See Rogstad, supra note 105 (providing an example of the involved
mitigation measures necessary to counteract wildfire).
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historians, and government employees.134 Psychological harms may
also arise from wildfire and people feel an intense desire to rebuild
damaged forests quickly.' 3 5
G. Wildlife Losses
Wildlife losses from wildfire can be considerable,136 and the deaths
are often painful and prolonged.
[a]fter a 120,000 acre fire in Wisconsin in 1930, 'the carcasses of
18 deer were found in the close proximity; undoubtedly many more
died because a 100% survey was not conducted. It was estimated
that after the fire 60% of the life deer in the region had badly burned
feet. A deer was encountered walking on its knees; its hooves and
foot bones had broken off due to excessive heat. The deer herds were
weakened so badly that they became ready prey to their natural
predators, thus providing another factor in diminishing their
number.'"37
In addition to the psychological harms that workers can experience
from seeing such devastation to the wildlife on timberland fiscal
losses may also ensue. 138
H. Countervailing Considerations
1. Mitigation
Mitigation measures taken by a forest manager to offset damage
are a corollary to most sources of damage. For example, foresters
134. See VOGT, supra note 20 (describing the perspectives of area residents, a
forester, an ecologist, a business owner, a firefighter, tourists, an environmentalist,
an historian, and a park ranger in response to a major fire).
135. DVD: LEGACY OF FIRE: THE STORY OF THE TILLAMOOK BURN (Tillamook
Forest Center, Oregon Department of Forestry 2008) (documentary video showing
the regeneration efforts of community groups culminating in the successful re-
growth of 350,000 acres of forest devastated by a series of burns).
136. FOLWEILER, supra note 102, at 27 (asserting that "[f]ires destroy timber and
affect all the wildlife which use the timber for shelter. In large fires particularly
game losses are tremendous.").
137. Id.
138. Wildlife have commercial value to land managers who sell the hunting
rights to their property. See Dean Lueck, Wildlife Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 693-701 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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engage large teams of workers after wildfire to mitigate soil
erosion,139 implement water quality measures, replant trees, harvest
damaged trees, and attempt to counteract disease and insect. 140
Although the costs of mitigation measures are considerable, they are
estimated to be less than the cost of inaction,141 and are necessary to
continue viable timber harvest operations. However, there is no
available study that demonstrates the frequency, cost, or efficiency of
mitigation measures foresters make to offset the damage caused by
wildfire.
2. Benefits Of Wildfire
Although generally characterized as disastrous, wildfires actually
produce a mix of ecological costs and benefits. 142 On one hand, fires
devastate forests by killing healthy trees and animals, contributing to
soil erosion, and damaging air quality.143 On the other hand,
occasional fires are essential to the health of wildlands.144 Fires rid
wildlands of diseased vegetation, reduce competition among plants
for resources such as light, and renew soil.14 5 In Westvaco Corp. v.
United States146 a timber company adjusted the amount of losses
caused by wildfire to account for "the estimated increase in value of
the affected area due to 'pine release' which is the elimination or
reduction of vegetative material, usually woody plants and trees, that
interfere with the growth of pine trees being managed."l 47 Indeed,
some plant species, such as the Lodgepole Pine, are dependent upon
139. See Rogstad, supra note 105.
140. Id.
14 1. Id.
142. GORTE, supra note 5.
143. See generally The True Cost of Wildfire in the Western U.S., W. FORESTRY
LEADERSHIP COAL. (2009), available at http://www.wflccenter.org/news df/32 4
pdf.pdf (providing an overview of wildfire costs beyond suppression).
144. Garza, supra note 6 (stating that "[f]ires are an integral part of the
ecosystem.").
145. Id. (commenting that "[flires ... enrich and renew the soil and get rid of old
and diseased vegetation.").
146. 639 F.2d 700 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
147. Id. at 703 n.5.
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fire for their intergenerational survival; they cannot reproduce
without it.148
In addition to ecological and social concerns, there are also legal
and tax advantages to property damaged by fire. The losses to
commercially-viable trees ("stumpage losses") may be partially or
fully offset in two ways. First, fire-damaged timber stands are subject
to fewer environmental regulations than regular forests.149
Emergency timber harvest plans can be used to clear more trees more
quickly than could otherwise be harvested. 150 In some cases, timber
that would not have been harvestable, due for example to local
regulations, can be harvested under state emergency harvest
procedures. Second, the owner of burned forest can claim some of
the value of lost timber on his taxes.152
V. PRESSING ISSUES OF WILDFIRE LAW
Having set forth a brief background about wildfire issues pertinent
to legal analysis, this section takes the next step of identifying the key
148. Id.; see also JAMES A. YOUNG & CHERYL G. YOUNG, SEEDS OF WOODY
PLANTS IN NORTH AMERICA 250 (Theodore R. Dudley ed., 1992) (noting that the
pinecones of some Lodgepole pine trees only open to release seeds when heated to
a temperature that is achieved by fire).
149. See Jon A. Souder & Sally K. Fairfax, Arbitrary Administrators, Capricious
Bureaucrats and Prudent Trustees: Does it Matter in the Review of Timber Salvage
Sales?, 18 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REv. 165, 185 (1997) (citing as an example the
fact that salvage sales for dead trees are exempted from the National Forest
Management Act because their "biological growth rate is presumed to be zero.").
150. See Marc Fink, Logging After Wildfire: Salvaging Value or Mugging a Burn
Victim?, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 193, 203 (2004) (". . . in July 2003, the Forest
Service published notice of new categorical exclusions for 'limited timber harvest'
including the 'salvage of dead and/or dying trees' on up to 250 acres.") (citation
omitted).
151. See Thomas N. Lippe & Kathy Bailey, Regulation of Logging on Private
Land in California under Governor Gray Davis, 31 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 351,
364 (2001) (observing that "local ordinances that attempt to regulate the conduct
of or impose additional permit requirements on timber operations are generally
preempted by state law.").
152. See Rogstad, supra note 105.
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legal and policy issues in wildfire law today. 5 3  Despite minimal
attention among academics, wildfire has garnered substantial public
attention. This section draws on media reports and interviews with
persons regularly engaged in wildfire issues to identify what I believe
are two of the most pressing areas of wildfire law. Further, this
section identifies some relevant considerations relating to each issue
raised.
A. Liability For Suppression Costs
Liability for suppression costs is a key litigation growth area in
wildfire law. Some state statutes permit government firefighting
agencies to charge parties responsible for starting wildfire the cost of
suppressing that fire, a practice known as "cost recovery."'15 4 On its
face, cost recovery seems like a reasonable way to replenish public
coffers. But, in practice, the liability issues and suppression activity
complicate cost-recovery efforts. Historically, the government and an
at-fault party settled a cost-recovery claim.' 55 In 2004, cost recovery
was estimated to yield four to six million dollars annually.156 But
recent exorbitant settlements and other factors are influencing parties
to litigate rather than settle.' 5 7 This litigation brings before courts,
for the first time in decades, key issues of wildfire liability and
suppression.
Many cases of liability spring from the accidental nature of most
wildfires. Humans start the majority of wildfires, but very few are
arsons. ss Power lines and railroads are two notorious sources of fire-
starters that can cause wildfire even in the cases of little or no
153. One cannot hope to provide comprehensive solutions to these widespread
issues in a single article, but taking the first step of identifying the most pressing
problems will serve as a catalyst for future study.
154. CDF's Civil Cost Recovery Program, CAL. DEP'T OF FORESTRY AND FIRE




157. See id (providing two examples of multimillion dollar negotiated
settlements); see also Keiter, supra note 5, at 332.
158. Sue Russell, Catching Arsonists Red-Handed, MILLER-MCCUNE, Feb. 15,
2010, http://www.miller-mccune.com/legal-affairs/catching-arsonists-red-handed-
9062/ (noting that a small number of wildfires are intentionally-set).
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negligence. While public utilities and railroads are required to
employ basic safety measures, such as clearing vegetation near a
power line or railroad track, it is difficult if not impossible to
properly protect thousands of miles of power lines or railroad tracks.
Further, where humans directly cause the start of a wildfire, they may
be strictly liable for the cost of suppressing it, regardless of the steps
they took to avoid fire risk.159  While many private persons are
judgment proof against civil cost recovery efforts, the strict liability
standard becomes problematic for companies who are responsible for
the actions of their employees under respondeat superior.
The second complicating factor is determining the appropriate cost
of suppression to assess the responsible party. The problem is that
suppression costs are both highly discretionary, and completely out of
the control of the responsible party.160 Government agencies exercise
absolute authority in wildfire decision-making, and can set the cost of
suppression by choosing certain firefighting methodologies and
through the timing of their actions.161 Firefighters have chosen to let a
fire burn for several weeks before deciding to fight it.162  In the
159. See Yoder, supra note 5, 1-3 (noting strict liability regimes for starting a
wildfire).
160. The government controls firefighting efforts. Private individuals do not get
to make decisions about which or how many resources the government will employ
during a wildfire. For an example of how firefighting decisions are made among
agencies, but not involving private parties, see Div. OF FORESTRY, ALASKA DEP'T
OF NATURAL RES., supra note 29 (noting that "[f]ire management planning,
preparedness, suppression operations, prescribed fire, and related activities will be
coordinated on an interagency basis with the full involvement of DOF and its state,
federal and local government cooperators. The Division of Forestry, Bureau of
Land Management, and the U.S. Forest Service, fight fires within their protection
areas on all land ownerships which reduces the duplication of facilities and
services. None of the agencies in Alaska have all of the resources required to
accomplish the fire protection job on their own. The Division of Forestry has
cooperative agreements with the Departments of Agriculture and Interior, and
numerous local government and volunteer fire departments to help get the job done.
The state and federal agencies routinely utilize each other's personnel and
resources to both manage and fight fires. This is efficient and cost effective.").
161. Id.
162. This surprising level of discretion is attributable to the need to prioritize
among many fires, or obtain agency-oriented objectives such as training
opportunities for firefighters or vegetation management through letting fire bum.
See Memorandum, supra note 30, at 4 (stating that "[f]ires can now be managed for
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interim, the fire may expand far beyond its original size, and the
suppression costs may multiple exponentially. Further, firefighting
methodologies may vary greatly in cost and efficiency,1 63 but the
persons deciding which methodologies to employ are not paying the
bill in cost-recovery scenarios.164
B. Mixed Incentives
Wildland holdings give rise to parties with differing objectives.
For example, a heavily forested state park might be adjacent to an
environmental reserve, a small subdivision, and/or timberlands
owned by a commercial forestry operation. Consequently, when
wildfire strikes an area, the goals of affected landowners can vary
dramatically. The environmental group may want its holding to
experience wildfire, whereas the commercial forestry owner would
seek to protect his timber against wildfire, and homeowners seek to
protect their homes and personal property. 165  The conflicting
multiple objectives, which may change as conditions on the fire change."). Some
familiar with firefighting practices allege that the authority is misused by
firefighters to allow campaign fires to develop as a means of agency-aggrandizing
through attracting public attention and resources. See also supra Part II.
163. Richard Mangan, a wildfire expert employed by the U.S. Forest Service is
quoted as saying, "Often we use resources because of the public and political
pressure to do something, even though it has no effect on the fire and is an
economic waste." INGALSBEE, supra note 88. In 2008, the L.A. Times published an
expose on intentional waste of resources by government firefighting agencies,
reporting that expense aircraft is often used during fire in response to political
pressure, even when it is known that the use of aircraft will not further fire
suppression goals. Julie Cart & Bettina Boxall, Air Tanker Drops in Wildfires are
Often Just for Show, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2008, available at http://www.latimes.
com/news/local/politics/cal/la-me-wildfires29-2008jul29,0,3486219.story. This is
an expense exercise: "Aviation costs amount to about one-fifth of [U.S. Forest
Service] fire-suppression spending... $296 million in 2007." Id.
164. See DIV. OF FORESTRY, ALASKA DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., supra note 29.
165. Ideological differences in the use of land differ starkly, and become
especially problematic because the use of one land may hinder the use of adjacent
land in wildfire settings. For example, by not harvesting timber, the environmental
group creates a more natural setting, but also increases the risk of wildfire
spreading across their property to other adjacent timberlands. One landowner
fulfilling her objective directly negatively hinders the ability of another landowner
to fulfill his objective.
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responsibilities, motivations, incentives, and tensions of different
groups come to the fore under the stressful circumstances of wildfire.
On the one hand, government firefighting agencies are especially
useful in quelling these tensions. Having a unitary actor invested
with full authority to make decisions is helpful; the opposite result in
a setting of diverse landowners would almost certainly be chaos.
But, decision-makers at government firefighting agencies are also
incentivized, albeit in different ways. Further, the protections of
sovereign immunity provide considerable opportunity to make
decisions concerning the destruction of private property or important
ecological interests without internalizing the cost. In other words, by
making decisions about what will happen on privately-held lands,
firefighters can cause a great deal of intentional, purposeful damage
for which they cannot legally be held responsible, or made to
compensate. The result can harm the interests of environmentalists
and private landowners, who are left without recourse.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article provides a broad overview of the most important
information and issues in wildfire law today. This background
information about the key concepts, stakeholders, and issues provides
both background and a challenge to future legal scholars,
policymakers, and practitioners who will work on issues related to
the costly and ever-growing spread of wildfire. Although the central
issues of liability for cost suppression and mixed incentives were
discussed here, many other issues exist along the dimensions of
environmental law, tort liability, and economic analysis of efficient
suppression resources. Increased attention to these issues is
mandated by the incredible loss of natural resources and property lost
in the ceaseless increase of wildfires experienced over the past
decade. By providing critical analysis and policy suggestions,
however, scholars can provide vital, much-needed assistance in
crafting solutions that will stem the natural disasters and alleviate the
high costs wrought upon stakeholders and the general public.
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